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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JANE WALTERS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LOUIS MARK WALTERS, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 910316 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the manner in which the Utah Court of Appeals 
considered the factual findings of the trial court conflict with 
established standards of review? 
2. Should the Supreme Court of Utah settle the question of 
whether a married couple's period of cohabitation prior to the 
solemnization of their marriage can be considered a part of their 
marriage? 
3. Should the Utah Supreme Court consider Appellee's challenge 
to Appellant's standing? 
OPINION OP THE COURT OP APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals issued its opinion in this matter on 
the 14th day of May, 1991. The opinion was published in the Utah 
Advance Reports as Walters v. Walters, 160 Ut. Adv. Rep. 47. A 
copy of such opinion is attached to this Petition as Appendix "A". 
JURISDICTION 
As noted above, the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals was 
issued on the 14th day of May, 1991. On the 13th day of June, 
1991, Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court for the State of Utah 
an Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of Time. A copy of such Ex 
Parte Motion is included herein as Appendix "B". Such motion was 
granted although a written ruling on such motion was not provided 
to the parties• This Court has jurisdiction to consider this writ 
pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(a), §78-2a-4 of the Utah Code, and Rule 45 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated 
30-3-3. Temporary alimony and suit money. 
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk a sum of 
money for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse party 
and the children, and to enable such party to prosecute or defend 
the action. 
Utah Code Annotated 
30-3-5. Disposition of Property - Maintenance and health care of 
the parties and children - Court to have continuing jurisdiction -
Custody and visitation - Termination of alimony - Non-meritorious 
petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
and parties.... 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A;...Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses.... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an action for divorce, 
concerning distribution of property and an award of attorney's 
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fees. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. This matter 
was originally commenced by the filing of Plaintiff's (HELEN'S) 
Complaint for divorce on the 26th day of October, 1987. Trial was 
held on the 7th day of February, 1989. The trial court issued it 
Memorandum Decision on the 15th day of February, 1989, (attached 
hereto as Appendix "C"). Pursuant to a directive in such 
Memorandum Decision, HELEN filed an Affidavit in Support of 
Attorney's Fees (attached hereto as Appendix "D"). On the 31st day 
of July, 1989, the trial court issued a subsequent Memorandum 
Decision awarding HELEN One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) of 
attorney's fees (attached hereto as Appendix "E"). Thereafter, on 
the 5th day of October, 1989, the trial court entered its written 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (attached hereto as 
Appendix "F"). On the 30th of October, 1989, the court entered its 
written Amended Decree of Divorce (attached hereto as Appendix 
"G"). On the 9th day of November, 1989, Defendant (LEWIS) filed 
his Notice of Appeal (attached hereto as Appendix "H") . 
After briefing and argument by the parties to the Utah Court 
of Appeals, that court issued its opinion on the 14th day of May, 
1991, (see again Appendix "A"). Thereafter, HELEN filed her Ex 
Parte Motion for Enlargement of Time (see again Appendix "B") 
followed by her Petition for Writ of Certiorari on the 15th day of 
July, 1991. The parties stipulated to the filing of this Corrected 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari which was then filed on the dated 
indicated by the clerk's stamp. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(All references in this section are to pages and lines of the 
Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Trial, i.e. 6:1307:22 is a 
reference to page 6, line 13 through page 7, line 22 of the 
transcript•) 
HELEN, and LEWIS, were married on the 5th day of October, 1984 
[3:10-15]. They separated when HELEN filed this action in October 
of 1987 [11:10-11]. 
The parties originally met in late 1978, slightly less than 
six (6) years prior to their marriage [29:10-32:8; Plaintifffs 
Exhibit #4]. At the time they met, HELEN lived in a mobile home 
situated in Orem [14:1-15:9]. Shortly after they met, the parties 
began living together in HELEN'S mobile home in Orem [17:9-19:2; 
32:22-33:6; 34:4-35:9; Plaintifffs Exhibit #4]. For a brief time 
LEWIS1 son lived with them in Orem [32:22-33:6]. LEWIS and HELEN 
lived in the trailer until 1980 when they moved it to a pad LEWIS 
purchased in a trailer park in Pleasant Grove, situated at 625 
South 50 West [35:10-36:5]. 
HELEN was employed at Geneva Steel from before the time the 
parties met through the time of the trial, except for a time when 
the plant temporarily ceased operations in 1981 and 1982 [35:14-
37:7]. LEWIS was employed at Hill Air Force Base from 1967 through 
the date of the trial [84:19-85:2]. His work sometimes took him 
out of state on temporary duty assignments. LEWIS earned a 
retirement benefit as a result of his employment [85:3-86:2]. 
Between his temporary assignments LEWIS' base of employment 
was at Hill and his home was HELENfs trailer [52:25-53:18]. For 
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the years 1979 through 1983, the years the parties cohabited but 
prior to the parties1 marriage, LEWIS listed his permanent address 
on his federal income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant 
Grove, the site of the trailer he occupied with HELEN [75:4-8; 
76:10-14] . 
HELEN had a minor daughter, Shantel, who was 12 years old at 
the time of trial and who had lived with LEWIS in the parties1 
trailer home from the time the parties first met when she was not 
quite three [39:23-40:18; 59:18-20]. Prior to their marriage the 
parties agreed that Shantel would use the surname of Walters at 
school and church rather than HELEN'S surname [40:22-4 3:25]. LEWIS 
shared responsibility for the financial support of Shantel [59:18-
60:16]. LEWIS listed Shantel as a dependent living with him on his 
1982, 1983, and 1984 federal income tax returns [77:2-78:17]. 
Before they were married, LEWIS also helped HELEN pay for certain 
debts she had accumulated, testifying that he "[d]idn!t expect 
nothing [in return]" [86:3-88:10]. 
Shortly before the parties met, LEWIS began purchasing a 
parcel of realty in Highland, Utah, [94:15-24]. LEWIS kept a 
second mobile home on this property from before the time the 
parties met through October, 1985, when he moved the trailer to a 
second trailer pad he purchased at 64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant 
Grove, near the site of the parties' home [100:20-101:5]. This 
second trailer, while situated in Highland, was variously described 
by witnesses as either 'unlivable' [24:22-25:25], occupied by a 
renter [27:12-28:4], or used for storage [53:19-54:17], but never 
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as LEWIS1 residence [63:5-12]• 
From the time that HELEN'S trailer was moved to the pad in 
Pleasant Grove in 1980 through and after the time LEWIS1 trailer 
was moved from Highland to the neighboring pad in Pleasant Grove, 
the parties pooled their monies and efforts to improve the three 
(3) properties with an eye toward eventually using the value of the 
two (2) trailer properties to invest in building a home in Highland 
[56:4-23; 64:9-65:7; 114:14-115:25]. When HELEN was laid off from 
Geneva, LEWIS felt it would be better if she didn't seek substitute 
work because her efforts were needed to maintain and improve their 
properties [45:4-23] . 
They made numerous improvements to the property on which 
HELEN'S trailer was placed, including concrete driveways and out-
buildings [96:20-97:7]. LEWIS financed most of these improvements 
while HELEN arranged for, supervised, and participated in the work 
[37:15-39:3; Plaintiff's Exhibit #4]. HELEN'S earnings were spent 
on utilities, groceries, and "keeping things in the home front 
going" [39:4-19]. They built a large utility building on the 
Highland property [83:9-16]. Again, HELEN arranged for and 
participated in the work of laying the pad and water line, erecting 
the building, and installing solar heating [45:24-46:13; 55:14-21]. 
All of the real property was purchased in LEWIS' name only, 
even the trailer pad bought after the marriage [60:17-61:13]. 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
(1) In reversing the trial court's award to HELEN of certain 
property interests in real property and retirement benefits 
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acquired by LEWIS prior to the solemnization of their marriage and 
in reversing the trial court's award to HELEN of attorney's fees in 
the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), the Utah Court of 
Appeals failed to apply several important and well established 
standards of review for challenges to a trial court's findings of 
fact. Those standards include the requirements that appellant 
establish clear error, marshall the evidence, and preserve issues 
for appeal. Had the Court of Appeals properly applied such 
standards, it would have determined that LEWIS did not carry his 
burden on appeal and would not have reversed the trial court's two 
(2) awards. 
(2) This Court should settle the question of whether a period 
of pre-marital cohabitation can be considered a part of the 
marriage. 
(3) Finally, this Court should allow HELEN to raise her 
objection to LEWIS' standing to challenge the trial court's award 
of interests in his real property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS CONSIDERED THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE 
TRIAL COURT IN CONFLICT WITH ESTABLISHED STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. The Standards of Review 
1. Findings of Fact: 
As noted, Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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provides that "findings of fact...shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, " In several cases the Utah Court of Appeals 
has defined its responsibility under Rule 52(a) . "We will not set 
aside a trial court's findings of fact unless they are against the 
clear weight of the evidence or we otherwise reach a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake had been made,..." Smith v. Linmar 
Energy Corp, 790 P.2d 1222 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). In its detailed 
and instructional opinion issued in State v. Vigil, 164 Ut. Adv. 
Rep. 28 (Ut. Ct. App. June 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals 
explained why appellate courts give deference to trial court's 
findings of fact. In Vigil, the Utah Court of Appeals stated 
"Uniquely within the province of the trial court is the 
establishment of the predicate facts which emerge after 
consideration of all testimony and the weighing of credibility. 
Thus, we will not intrude upon the trial court's distillation of 
the facts from contradictory evidence unless such findings are 
clearly erroneous." 
2. Marshalling of the Evidence: 
The appellate courts have also described the burden that must 
be met by a party who challenges the sufficiency of a trial court's 
findings. 
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's factual 
findings, an appellant must marshall all of the evidence 
in support of the trial court's findings and demonstrate 
that, even in viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the findings, the evidence is insufficient 
to support the findings, Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 
P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985), or that its findings are otherwise 
clearly erroneous." Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 
(Ut. App. Ct. 1989). 
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Recently in State v. Ouas, 163 Ut. Adv. Rep. 4 6 (Ut. Ct. App. 
June 1991), an appeal from a criminal conviction, the court refused 
to even consider the appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence because appellant failed to marshall the evidence and 
demonstrate how that evidence, including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, was insufficient to support the findings. In 
Vigil, supra, the Court of Appeals defined the marshalling burden 
as a "rigid requirement." Similarly, in Walton v. Walton, 164 Ut. 
Adv. Rep. 56 (Ut. Ct. App. June 1991), in an appeal from a divorce 
action, the Court of Appeals again refused to consider the 
appellant's challenge to the trial court's findings of fact 
reasoning: 
If the appellants fails to marshall the evidence, the 
appellate court assumes that the record supports the 
findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of 
the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and 
the application of that law to the case. 
From well before the decision issued in this case through the 
Court of Appeals' most recently reported opinions, appellant's 
burden of marshalling the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings when challenging those findings, has been a prerequisite 
to a review of the sufficiency of the evidence. 
3. Preservation of Issues for Appeal: 
"As the Utah appellate courts have reiterated many times, 
[they] generally will not consider an issue, even a constitutional 
one, which appellant raises on appeal for the first time." State 
v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Ut. App. Ct. 1990). See also State v. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985) and State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 
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(Utah 1989). In two of its most recently published opinions, the 
Utah Court of Appeals has strictly enforced this need to preserve 
issues for appeal in refusing to consider issues that were not 
properly preserved. See State v. Cayer. 164 Ut. Adv. Rep. 35 (Ut. 
Ct. App. June 1991) and State v. Curry, 164 Ut. Adv. Rep. 63 (Ut. 
Ct. App. June 1991). 
B. The Trial Court's Property Awards 
In reversing portions of the trial court's property awards, 
the Court of Appeals took a two-step approach. First, it ruled 
that all property acquired prior to solemnization of the parties' 
marriage must be considered separate property. Then it ruled that 
the trial court had not found sufficient exceptional circumstances 
that would warrant awarding any of LEWIS' separate property to 
HELEN. In discussing the second step of its analysis, the court 
did not address LEWIS' failure to marshall the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings nor his failure to show that despite 
such supporting the evidence, the trial court's findings were 
clearly erroneous. Rather, the appellate court, on its own, 
indicated that the weight of the evidence did not seem to support 
an award to HELEN of a portion of LEWIS' separate property. In 
effect, the appellate court simply reweighed the evidence 
notwithstanding that LEWIS did not shoulder the burden necessary 
for appellate review and notwithstanding that the appellate court 
did not find the trial court's view of the evidence was clearly 
erroneous. 
In so doing, the Court of Appeals committed two (2) errors. 
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First, it assumed that the trial court could not determine from the 
facts that the parties1 marital relationship began at a time prior 
to the actual solemnization of their relationship. This Court 
should review whether the trial court's determination of the actual 
beginning of the parties' relationship is properly a factual 
determination. Second, the Utah Court of Appeals violated its own 
long standing requirement that in reviewing challenges to the 
sufficiency of a trial court's findings of facts, appellant, not 
the appellate court, must marshall all evidence in support of those 
findings and then demonstrate how those findings are nevertheless 
insufficient. In this case, the Court of Appeals was itself 
apparently confused by the "vexing nature of the distinction 
between questions of fact and questions of law." Pullman-Standard, 
456 U.S. at 288, which distinction it so carefully described later 
in Vigil. 
This Court should grant certiorari on this issue because the 
Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's findings of fact 
without requiring a marshalling of the evidence or a showing of 
clear error in the findings. 
C. The Trial Court's Award of Attorney's Fees 
As with the trial court's property award, the Utah Court of 
Appeals reversed an award to HELEN of her partial attorney's fees. 
Similarly, it did so without requiring that Appellant marshall the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and without 
determining that the trial court was clearly erroneous. Again the 
appellate court simply disagreed with the trial court's weighing of 
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the evidence and reversed on the strength of its own view of the 
weight of the evidence. 
Moreover, the award of attorney's fees was reversed in spite 
of LEWIS' failure to object to the award at the trial level, and 
HELEN'S argument on appeal that LEWIS had failed to preserve the 
issue (see Appendix "I"). 
This Court should grant certiorari to review this issue for 
the same reasons that it should grant certiorari to review the Utah 
Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court's property award. An 
additional reason to review the reversal of attorney's fees is the 
Court of Appeals' failure to recognize that appellant had not 
preserved that issue for appeal. This Court should make a clear 
statement of whether challenges to the sufficiency of a trial 
court's findings of fact must meet these three (3) standards for 
review or whether Utah appellate courts may invade and redecide the 
facts of the case without requiring marshalling, preservation of 
issues, or a showing of clear error by the trial court. 
POINT II 
THE SUPREME COURT OP UTAH, AS A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION, 
SHOULD SETTLE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER, IN APPROPRIATE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, A MARRIED COUPLE'S PERIOD OF COHABITATION 
PRIOR TO THE SOLEMNIZATION OF THEIR MARRIAGE CAN BE CONSIDERED 
A PART OF THEIR MARRIAGE 
As noted, the Court of Appeals ruled "[u]nder Utah law the 
Walters' relationship could not be treated as a marriage prior to 
its solemnization on October 5, 1984 Therefore, we conclude as 
a matter of law that the Walters' marriage began on October 5, 
1984, the date of its solemnization." The Court of Appeals 
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reasoned that §30-1-4.5, Utah's Common Law Marriage statute, could 
not be applied to that period of time during which the parties 
cohabited prior to solemnization of their marriage- In so ruling, 
it implied that §30-1-4.5 can be the only legal basis for 
legitimizing the period of cohabitation. This determination was 
reached even though HELEN argued that the trial court's record did 
not include any indication that either of the parties argued for or 
against the application of the section to the facts nor did the 
court cite to the section in either its Findings of Facts or 
Conclusions of Law, but that the argument against the application 
of this section was raised by LEWIS for the first time in his brief 
on appeal. 
This Court should grant certiorari to settle the question of 
whether a married couple's period of pre-marital cohabitation can 
be, in appropriate circumstances, considered a part of their legal 
marriage. It should do so for the following reasons: 
(a) This is an issue which does not appear to have been 
squarely addressed by either the Utah Court of Appeals or 
the Utah Supreme Court prior to this decision and 
therefore this Court should settle the issue; 
(b) Contrary to the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, the 
determination of the date of the beginning of a marital 
relationship may be a factual finding most properly left 
to the discretion of the trial court; 
(c) This Court should determine if it is inequitable and an 
unequal protection of the laws to recognize a solemnized 
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relationship and a common law relationship but not a 
relationship based on substantially similar facts which 
does not fit squarely within either §30-1-4.5 or within 
the definition of a solemnized marriage; 
(d) If the determination of the date of the beginning of the 
marital relationship is in fact a legal question, this 
Court can affirm the trial court on any proper ground 
even though the trial court assigned another reason for 
its ruling [see State v. Bryan, 709 P. 2d 257 (Utah 1985), 
In Re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982), Peterson 
v, Peterson. 645 P.2d 37 (Utah 1982), Buehner v. UWC 
Associates, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988), State v. One 1979 
Pontiac Trans Am. 771 P.2d 682 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), Haaen 
v. Haaen. 810 P.2d 478 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991), State v. 
Belgard. 160 Ut. Adv. Rep. 42 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991)]. 
Partners to a valid marriage are presumed to share 50/50 in 
all property interests acquired by either of them during the term 
of the marriage. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). 
Such proportionate share of property interests is not determined 
solely by the financial contributions of the two (2) parties. 
Dunn, supra, Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986), and Martinez 
v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 69 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). Presumably this 
benefit inures to all partners in all marriages, whether their 
marriage be solemnized or legitimized by way of §30-1-4.5. Yet in 
this case, the Utah Court of Appeals has told HELEN that although 
the trial court found she had maintained a marital relationship 
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with LEWIS both before and after solemnization, and although that 
relationship did not change significantly after solemnization (see 
Appendix "F") , all property acquired in LEWIS1 name prior to the 
solemnization is LEWIS1 alone and she must show exceptional 
circumstances in order to have some interest in the property- In 
contrast, according to the theory of Dunn, it would be LEWIS1 
burden to establish why HELEN should not share equally in property 
acquired after solemnization of their marriage. This shifting of 
burdens and presumptions seems reasonable to the Court of Appeals 
even though the trial court found that the parties1 relationship 
was consistently the same from the time they first met, some four 
(4) years prior to their marriage, until the time that HELEN filed 
her Complaint for divorce. 
Further, §3 0-1-4.5(2) provides that "the determination or 
establishment of a marriage under this section must occur during 
the relationship described in sub-section (1), or within one year 
following the termination of that relationship.11 The irony and the 
inequity of the Court of Appeals1 ruling in this case is that if a 
party maintains a common law relationship that eventually blossoms 
into a solemnized marriage that is fortunate enough to endure for 
more than one (1) year, that party is prevented by the foregoing 
statutory limitation as well as the effects of this case from ever 
legitimizing his or her pre-marital relationship. As a result, 
that party would be prevented from sharing in any property 
interests acquired by the other party unless he or she were able to 
establish extraordinary circumstances. 
15 
The Court of Appeals viewed this case as simply a matter of 
marital property versus separate property, giving short shrift to, 
and finding no significance in the trial court's finding that the 
parties maintained a marital relationship during all periods when 
the property was acquired. It is respectfully argued that the 
Court of Appeals1 approach to the issue was simplistic and 
unrealistic. This Court should review the ruling in this case to 
determine if there is sound public policy reasoning for 
discouraging common law partners from marrying as this case does, 
or for discriminating against a class of people such as HELEN!s 
whose only distinguishing feature is that it sits between that 
class of persons who cohabit but never marry and that class of 
persons who participate in a solemnized marriage without prior 
cohabitation. This Court should accept this case to consider 
argument both for and against recognizing a married couple's pre-
marital period of cohabitation as a logical and legal extension of 
their marriage. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD CONSIDER APPELLEE1S 
CHALLENGE TO APPELLANTS STANDING 
In footnote #1 of its Decision, the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated that it refused to consider HELEN'S argument that LEWIS 
lacked standing to challenge the trial court's real property award. 
The court stated that HELEN had not properly supplemented the 
record on appeal with evidence of alleged transactions related to 
the real property in question. HELEN had attached certified copies 
of a Quit Claim Deed and two (2) Warranty Deeds to her Brief of 
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Respondent. Copies of those three (3) certified deeds are attached 
hereto as Exhibits "J", "K" and "L". 
HELEN concedes that the record on appeal at the Utah Court of 
Appeals level was not properly supplemented. However, because 
"either party, or even the court on its own motion, may properly 
raise standing for the first time on appeal," Blodgett v. Zion's 
First National Bank. 752 P.2d 901 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988), Terracor v. 
Utah Board of State Lands. 716 P.2d 796 (Ut. 1986), Utah Restaurant 
Association v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159 (Ut. 
1985), Health Tecna Corp. v. Sound Systems International, Inc., 588 
P.2d 169 (Ut. 1978), HELEN raises this issue in this Petition 
simply to preserve it should this Court grant certiorari to 
consider other issues raised hereinabove. Should this Court grant 
certiorari, HELEN seeks permission to properly supplement the 
record on appeal by proper motion under Rule 11(h) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure in order that this Court might 
consider whether LEWIS has standing sufficient to challenge the 
trial court's award of certain property interests to HELEN. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should grant certiorari to review the Utah Court of 
Appeals1 decision regarding the trial court's factual findings 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 46(c), for the 
reason that this panel of the Court of Appeals failed to apply long 
recognized standards for appellate review of challenges to the 
sufficiency of a trial courtfs findings. Further this Court should 
accept this matter for review pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate 
17 
Procedure, Rule 46(d) to settle the issue of whether a married 
couple's period of pre-marital cohabitation can be considered a 
part of their legal marriage. If accepted for review on any of 
these points, this Court should also allow HELEN to challenge 
LEWIS1 standing. 
DATED this *j?dD day of July, 1991. 
2^. THOMAS H. MEANS 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four copies 
of the foregoing Corrected Petition for Writ of Certiorari to 
Robert L. Moody, Attorney for Respondent, at 2 525 North Canyon 
Road, Provo, UT 84604 this 3 d day of July, 1991. 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellant, Lewis Mark Walter 
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Mark Walters*s standing to 
1.) Helen Walters argues that Mark Walters is without standing 
cause, after trial and prior to this appeal, he transferred 
to third parties his interests in the real properties at 
issue. However, her challenge to Mark Walters's standing is 
premised upon alleged transactions which took place subsequent 
to the trial court's memorandum decision and which are not part 
of the trial record or the record on appeal. Hence, appellee's 
remedy, if any, regarding those transactions lies in the trial 
court. 
FACTS 
Helen Walters and Mark Walters met in late 1978. Helen 
Walters, was then, and at all relevant times, employed at 
Geneva Steel. Mark Walters was employed by the United States 
Air Force and was frequently assigned temporary duty 
assignments out of state. When he would return to Utah for 
visits, Mark Walters lived with Helen Walters in her trailer. 
Mark Walters also maintained a habitable trailer on property 
(Parcel 1) he owned prior to meeting Helen Walters, in 
Highland, Utah. Parcel 1 had been purchased by Mark Walters in 
1977 and he made final payment on it in 1981. 
In addition to Parcel 1, Mark Walters owned a trailer pad 
at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah (Parcel 2). This 
had been purchased in his name in 1980. Helen Walters's mobile 
trailer was moved to Parcel 2 in 1980. Mark Walters paid all 
the expenses incurred as result of that move. Helen Walters 
arranged for and participated in improvements to this property 
and Mark Walters paid for those improvements. 
From 1978 through 1983, Helen Walters filed her separate 
tax returns under the name of Hunter. Her daughter, Shantel, 
from a previous marriage, resided with Helen and Mark Walters, 
and was enrolled in school under the last name of Walters. In 
addition Mark Walters contributed to Shantel's financial 
support. Mark Walters's 1982 through 1984 federal income tax 
returns listed Shantel as a dependent living with him. In 
1984, the parties were ceremoniously married and they filed a 
joint income tax return. Prior to 1984, the parties maintained 
separate checking accounts. 
In July 1985, Mark Walters purchased a third trailer pad 
located at 640 South 50 West in Pleasant Grove, Utah (Parcel 
3). This property was in the same trailer park as Parcel 2. 
In October 1985, he moved his trailer from Parcel 1 in 
Highland, Utah, to Parcel 3. 
On October 26, 1987, Helen Walters filed for divorce, and 
on February 7, 1989, the parties appeared before the trial 
court to terminate their marriage and divide their real and 
personal property. Following the trial, the court issued a 
memorandum decision finding "that the parties began to carry on 
a marriage-like relationship on or about January 1, 1980, which 
was several years before the marriage was actually 
solemnized.** The court determined that Helen Walters was to 
receive Parcel 2 in Pleasant Grove where her mobile home was 
located, Mark Walters was to keep Parcels 1 and 3. Helen 
Walters was also awarded a portion of Mark Walters's retirement 
benefits to be calculated from January 1, 1980, using the 
formula set forth in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 205-06 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). On July 31, 1989, in a second memorandum 
decision, the trial court awarded Helen Walters $1,000 for 
attorney fees "based on need and the relative ability of the 
parties to pay," 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In divorce proceedings, the trial court has considerable 
discretion concerning property distribution. This court will 
not disturb the trial court's decision unless it is clearly 
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 751 
P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
In distributing the parties' property, the trial court 
found that they began to carry on a marriage-like relationship 
on or about January 1, 1980. In making this finding, the court 
considered a number of factors: (1) Mark Walters stayed in 
Helen Walters's trailer with her when he was not working out of 
state, (2) Mark Walters had Helen Walters's trailer moved onto 
a lot for which he was paying, and did not charge rent, (3) 
Helen Walters made improvements on the property such as would 
be expected of a married couple, (4) Mark Walters paid debts 
for the plaintiff including debts to the I.R.S. and the tax 
commission, and (5) while working out of state, Mark Walters 
sent Helen Walters money on which to live. 
Mark Walters challenges the trial court's property 
distribution on grounds that the trial court erred in ruling 
that their marriage relationship began January 1, 1980, and in 
distributing the property according to that ruling. Helen 
Walters argues that the trial court did not err, but rather 
used its broad discretion in distributing the parties' 
premarital and marital property. 
"When a decree of divorce is entered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
property, and parties. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1) 
(1989). The Utah Supreme Court has concluded that this statute 
confers "broad discretion upon trial courts in the division of 
property, regardless of its source or time of acquisition." 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134-35 (Utah 1987)(citations 
omitted). Further, "the purpose of property divisions is to 
allocate property in the manner which 'best serves the needs of 
the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate 
lives.'" Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 
1988) (quoting Burke 733 P.2d at 135))". 
As a general rule, however, premarital property is viewed 
as separate property, and equity usually requires that "each 
party retain the separate property he or she brought into the 
marriage." Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). However, this rule is not invariable. "In 
fashioning an equitable property division, trial courts need 
consider all of the pertinent circumstances." Burke, 733 P.2d 
at 135. Factors generally considered are: 
the amount and kind of property to be 
divided; whether the property was acquired 
before or during the marriage; the source of 
the property; the health of the parties; the 
parties* standard of living, respective 
financial conditions, needs, and earning 
capacity; the duration of the marriage; the 
children of the marriage; the parties' ages 
at time of marriage and of divorce; what the 
parties gave up by the marriage; and the 
necessary relationship the property division 
has with the amount of alimony and child 
support to be awarded. Of particular 
concern . . . is whether one spouse has made 
any contribution toward the growth of the 
separate assets of the other spouse and 
whether the assets were accumulated or 
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties. 
Id. (Citations omitted). Thus, where unique circumstances 
exist, a trial court may reallocate premarital property as part 
of a property division incident to divorce. Haumont, 793 P.2d 
at 424-25. See also Burt v. Burt. 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 32 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
Implicit in this analysis is the requirement that the trial 
court, before exercising its discretionary power to distribute 
property, determine what property is premarital and what 
property is marital. To that end, the court must properly 
determine when the parties were lawfully married. 
To permit appellate review of a trial court's property 
division, the lower court must have made adequate factual 
findings. Haumont, 793 P.2d at 425. The findings should be 
"'sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached.'" Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 
199, 202-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(quoting Acton v. Deliran. 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). 
In the instant case, the findings are not altogether clear 
as to how the trial court determined what was premarital 
property and what was marital property- The court's analysis 
focused on various factors leading the court to conclude that 
the parties1 marriage-like relationship began January 1, 1980. 
We disagree. Under Utah law, the Walters1 relationship could 
not be treated as a marriage prior to its solemnization on 
October 5, 1984. "Before adoption of section 30-1-4.5 in 1987, 
Utah did not recognize an unsolemnized relationship as a 
marriage, even though the parties to the relationship may have 
acted in other respects as spouses."2 Lavton v. Lavton, 777 
P.2d 504, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(citing Mattes v. Olearain, 
759 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). Further, section 
30-1-4.5 may not be applied retroactively. Id. at 505. 
Therefore, we conclude as a matter of law that the Walters1 
marriage began on October 5, 1984, the date of its 
solemnization. Property acquired before that date is 
premarital property and property acquired after is marital 
property. Specifically, Parcels 1 and 2 are premarital 
properties and Parcel 3 is marital property. Further, any 
apportionment of Mark Walters's retirement benefits should be 
calculated by using the formula in Marchant and October 5, 1984 
used as the date of the parties' marriage. 
2. Section 30-1-4.5 recognizes a marriage relationship between 
cohabitants if the relationship satisfies certain specified 
requirements. 
3. It is unclear why the court awarded Helen Walters any 
interest in Mark Walters's retirement benefits while awarding 
him no interest in her benefits. Ordinarily, the court should 
either award each spouse his or her own benefits, or award each 
a fifty percent interest in the benefits of the other, insofar 
as accumulated during the marriage. See, e.g., Burt, 145 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 31. However, here Mark Walters's appeal of this 
issue is limited to arguing that the trial court used the wrong 
date in calculating Helen Walters's interest in his benefits. 
No argument was made that Helen Walters was entitled to no 
interest in Mark Walters's retirement benefits, nor that he was 
entitled to a corresponding interest in her benefits. 
Before a trial court can include either of the parties 
premarital property in the marital estate, it must find unique 
circumstances that warrant disregarding the general rule that 
premarital property is separate property. See Burke, 733 P.2d 
at 135; Haumont, 793 P.2d at 424-25. Those findings must be 
sufficiently detailed to show how the court distributed the 
parties1 property. Marchant, 743 P.2d at 202-03. In the case 
at bar, the only relevant unique circumstance discussed by the 
trial court was the fact that Helen Walters helped arrange for 
and make improvements to Parcels 1 and 2. The court did not 
consider any of the other factors generally considered by 
courts when equitably distributing property pursuant to a 
divorce. See Burke, 733 P.2d at 135; Haumont, 793 P.2d at 
425. Further, the findings are insufficiently detailed to 
indicate how the trial court arrived at its decision. 
Therefore, we remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision, and to make 
sufficiently detailed findings to support that distribution. 
On remand, the trial court should "first properly categorize 
the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as 
separate property of otie or the other." Burt, 145 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 32. As a starting point then, Mark Walters is entitled 
to all of Parcels 1 and 2, and a fifty percent interest in 
Parcel 3. Helen Walters is entitled to a fifty percent 
interest in Parcel 3. Following the analysis in Burt, "the 
court should then consider the existence of exceptional 
circumstances and, if any be shown, proceed to effect an 
equitable distribution in light of those circumstances . . . ." 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989), a court may award 
attorney fees in a divorce proceeding. "In order to award 
attorney fees, the trial court must find the requesting party 
is in need of financial assistance and that the fees requested 
are reasonable." Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
The record contains evidence upon which to find that the 
attorney fees awarded were reasonable. Helen Walters's 
attorney testified regarding the amount and type of services 
4. For example, since Helen Walters's trailer sits on Parcel 
2, Mark Walters's separate property, the court may decide to 
treat that parcel as marital property, and Parcel 3, otherwise 
marital property, as Mark Walters's separate property, assuming 
the two properties are of comparable value. 
rendered and submitted a supporting affidavit. However, the 
findings do not discuss the evidence upon which the trial court 
based Helen Walters's need for such fees. Moreover, upon 
reviewing the record, it is clear Helen Walters failed to 
demonstrate her need for an award of attorney fees. The trial 
court found that neither party was presently in need of 
financial support from the other. This finding suggests that 
Helen Walters is not in need of long-term financial 
assistance. Further, the record does not reveal that she has 
any need of short-term financial assistance. Therefore, we 
reverse the trial court's award of attorney fees. 
Helen Walters also seeks an award of attorney fees on 
appeal. She first asks this court to award attorney fees 
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 33(a) on the ground that this is a 
frivolous appeal. Obviously it is not, since appellant 
prevailed. 
Helen Walters also seeks an award of her attorney fees 
incurred in this appeal pursuant to section 30-3-3. This court 
has previously awarded attorney fees on appeal under section 
30-3-3. Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 163 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). However, as we have already discussed, in awarding 
attorney fees under section 30-3-3, both the need for, and the 
reasonableness of, an award of attorney fees must first be 
determined. Riche, 784 P.2d at 470. Helen Walters has not 
demonstrated a need for an award of attorney fees below. 
Further, we see no new circumstances warranting an award of 
attorney fees in this appeal. Therefore, we decline to award 
attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, we reverse and remand the trial court's 
distribution of the parties' property, and reverse the trial 
court's award of attorney fees. We decline to award fees on 
appeal. 
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Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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Bench, Judge 
THOMAS H. MEANS (2222) 
JLDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
4 3 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 
Telephone: 373-4912 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JANE WALTERS, : 
: EX PARTE MOTION FOR 
Petitioner, : ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
vs. : 
: Supreme Court No. 
LOUIS MARK WALTERS, : Appellate Court No. 890671 CA 
Respondent. : 
COMES NOW Petitioner, HELEN JANE WALTERS, by and through her 
attorney of record, Thomas H. Means, Esq., pursuant to Rules 22(b), 
22(c), 23, and 48(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, who 
hereby respectfully moves for this Court's order allowing for an 
extension of time for the filing of her Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. For good cause, movant asserts as follows: 
1. The extension is made necessary for the reason that 
Petitioner intends to ask this Court to review a question which may 
be a matter of first impression in this State. Petitioner felt it 
advisable to review decisions from sister states prior to filing 
the petition. Such research has taken longer than expected. 
2. The movant has not sought nor been granted any prior 
enlargement of time to file her Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
3- The decision of the Appellate Court which the Petitioner 
will seek review from was issued on the 14th day of May, 1991. The 
original time to file the Petition for Writ of Certiorari will 
expire on the 13th day of June, 1991. 
4. Petitioner seeks that the enlargement of time allow for 
either a 14-day extension for the filing of her petition pursuant 
to Rule 22(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or 30 days 
past the original time for filing or 10 days from the date of entry 
of the order granting the extension pursuant to Rule 4 8(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
5. Because this motion is filed prior to the expiration of 
the original time for filing of the petition, no prior notice is 
required to be served upon opposing parties, pursuant to Rule 
48(e). 
DATED this / 7 day of June, 1991. 
THOMZ^ H. MEAtfS 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the 
foregoing Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of Time to Robert L. 
Moody, Attorney for Respondent, at 2525 North Canyon Road, P.O. Box 
1466, Provo, UT 84603 this /3-K day of June, 1991. 
v/w^ A fTJjL 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT '™9 FEQ ,r 
IB pif ^  
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY S P 
•a******************* 
HELLEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER CV 87 2408 
-vs- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
•a******************* 
The Court, having conducted the trial of this matter on 
February 7th, 1989 and having taken all issues under advisement, 
will rule at this time. 
The Court finds that the parties in this action are 
residents of Utah County, and the Court has jurisdiction. Each 
of the parties is granted a divorce against the other on grounds 
of irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that such grounds 
exist. The Court will not award alimony to either party. 
There was an issue raised at trial as to exactly when 
the marital relationship between the parties began. The Court 
finds, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the parties 
began to carry on a marriage like relationship on or about 
January 1, 1980, which was several years, before the marriage was 
actually solemnized. 
The Court considered a number of factors in determining 
that the marital relationship began in 1980. Among these is the 
fact that the defendant stayed in the plaintiff's trailer with 
her when he was not working out of state. The defendant had the 
plaintifffs trailer moved onto a lot which he was paying for, and 
did not charge rent. The plaintiff made improvements on the 
property such as would be expected of a married couple- The 
defendant paid debts and obligations for the plaintiff including 
substantial debts to the I.R.S. and the State Tax Commission. 
The plaintiff's child with the defendant's consent was enrolled 
in school under the name Walters. While working out of state, 
the defendant sent the plaintiff money to live on. Based on the 
foregoing circumstances, the Court finds that the parties 
established a marital relationship beginning on or about January 
1st, 1980. This is an approximate date because the Court does 
not have sufficient evidence to fix an exact date. 
Because the Court considers the parties to have begun 
their marital relationship on January 1, 1980, plaintiff is 
entitled to a share of defendant's retirement benefits accrued 
during the existence of the marriage. The formula which is to be 
used to apportion the plaintiff's share of the retirement benefit 
is found in Marchant v. Marchantf 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). 
The plaintiff will not receive any retirement benefits until the 
defendant retires. If for any reason the defendant does not 
qualify for the benefit, neither will the plaintiff. In order to 
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become 
available, plaintiff's counsel must prepare an order which is to 
be filed with the defendant's- employer which will give the 
instructions for payment of retirement benefits to the plaintiff. 
The formula which Should be used in the order is Mone half of his 
total monthly payment times the fraction in which the numerator 
consists of the number of years or months they were married 
during which the defendant was employed by the federal government 
and the denominator is the total number of years or months 
defendant was in such employment." Marchant, at 206. The 
fraction cannot be determined until the defendant retires. If 
the parties wish to avoid the need to enter such an order, they 
The real property which is at issue was partially 
acquired before the marriage, and partially after. Considering 
when the properties were obtained, and how they were paid for, 
the Court finds the following to be an equitable division of the 
real property- The plaintiff is to receive the property in 
Pleasant Grove where her mobile home is located free and clear. 
The defendant may keep the Highland property which he acquired 
before the marriage, and the other Pleasant Grove property 
subject to the $5,000.00 encumbrance which is still owing on that 
property. The Court finds that this is a fair division of the 
property which was either acquired or paid for during the 
marriage. 
The Court, having no evidence as to the amount of money 
in the Deseret Bank, or the America First accounts during or 
before the marriage, will award plaintiff half of each of those. 
Plaintiff is to receive $400.00 from the Deseret Bank Account, 
and $2750.00 of the America First account. 
The Court has no evidence of values with which to 
divide the disputed personal property of the parties. The 
parties are therefore given the option of either agreeing on a 
division of property between themselves, or having one party 
prepare two lists of property and the other selecting a list. If 
the parties have not used one of these methods to divide the 
property within 10 days, the Court orders the property sold and 
the proceeds divided. 
The Court will consider the issue of attorney's fees 
upon submission of affidavits by counsel. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, and an order 
regarding retirement benefits, if necessary, and submit them to 
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to filing with the 
Court for signature. 
Dated this 15th day of February, 1989 
BY 
cc: Robert L. Moody, Esq. 
Thomas H. Means, Esq. 
. HARDING, JUDG 
1389 MM 22 P.'! ?-. G\ 
THOMAS H. MEANS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
81 East Center 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff,. 
v 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. 
) 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) No. CV 87 2408 
) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Utah ) 
Your affiant, upon his oath, swears and deposes as follows: 
1. My name is Thomas H. Means; I am an attorney in good 
standing, licensed by the Utah State Bar and holding Utah State Bar 
card #2222. I am experienced in the litigation of the character 
presented by this action. 
2. I am attorney of record for the party as indicated above. 
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3. In my capacity as attorney of record for such party I have 
reviewed the file and record of this matter, have consulted with my 
client and others, have advised my client by telephone and office 
visits, have prepared and filed pleadings, have discovered the 
facts attendant to the issues, and have appeared in a 
representative capacity for and with my client at each and all 
hearings as may be indicated by the file of this matter. 
Specifically, actions necessitated by the exigencies of this matter 
include the following: 
Ex Parte Motions for Temporary Restraining Order, 
Preliminary Injunction, and Order to Show Cause, 
Affidavits and Temporary Restraining Order and Order to 
Show Cause, meetings and consultation with Sheriff, 
Hearing of Order To Show Cause, Stipulation, Preliminary 
Injunction. Order, consultation with Pleasant Grove 
detective and Pleasant Grove City Attorney regarding 
Defendant's first violation of Temporary Restraining 
Order, pre-trial hearing, Pre-Trial Order, Affidavits in 
support of and second Motidn for Order to Show Cause, 
second Order to Show Cause, hearing on second Order to 
Show Cause, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment Upon Order to Show Cause, consultation with 
Pleasant Grove Police and Utah County Attorney regarding 
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Defendant's second violation of Preliminary Injunction, 
three sets of Plaintiff's Interrogatories, and 
Certificates of Service, three sets of responses to 
Defendant's Interrogatories, review of records of Utah 
County Recorder, four Lis Pendens, telephone consultation 
with pay clerk at Hill Air Force Base, consultation with 
real estate appraiser, telephone consultation with banks 
and credit union regarding accounts, multiple meetings 
and consultations with investigator, research of case 
law, Subpoenas for records and appearances (8), telephone 
consultation with Alpine School District, research of 
federal right to privacy law [USCA, Section 552(a)] and 
Motion to Compel for response to Subpoena, consultation 
with parties' tax preparer, review of Defendant's tax 
returns, trial preparation^ trial, Release of Lis 
Pendens. drafts of final Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, Decree of Divorce, Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order, Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees, 
4. I have contracted with my client to provide such services, 
consultations, and representations at the rate of $60.00 per hour. 
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5. I have dedicated 77.52 hours to date in representation of 
my client in this matter. 
6. As per said fee agreement, and through 19 March, 1989, my 
client has incurred the following expenses in this action: 
attorney fees $4651.00 
advances-service costs 27.00 
filing fees 87.00 
recorders fees 40.00 
witness fees 14.00 
accounting costs . 32.00 
investigations 500.00 
appraisals 450.00 
total $5801.00 
7. To date my client has expended $1782.00 toward the above-
noted expenses of this action. 
8. The present unpaid balance of the expenses of this action 
is $4019.00 all of which balance constitutes unpaid attorneyfs 
fees. 
9. I believe such rate and such total fees at this stage of 
the proceedings to be reasonable, given the amount in controversy, 
the time necessarily expended by me in the matter, the relative 
complexity of the matter, and the comparable rates charged and time 
that would likely be dedicated to such representation by other 
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competent attorneys licensed to practice in this Court, and I 
further believe the various actions taken in Plaintiff's behalf in 
the prosecution of her claims have been reasonable, necessary, 
supported by good cause, and not frivolous nor brought in bad faith 
nor for delay nor harassment. 
10. After-accruing fees will be as set forth in a Supplemental 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, if appropriate. 
11. Your affiant proffers that Plaintiff is totally self-
supported from income earned from her present employment at Geneva 
Steel, that in addition to supporting herself she is responsible 
for the total support of her daughter Shirley Schantell Hunter 
(Walters) whom she has custody of, and is partially supporting 
another adult daughter, Angela Cassingham, who lives with 
Plaintiff, who maintains part-time employment with a janitorial 
service, and who is afflicted with a disease which presently 
prevents her from maintaining full time employment and from living 
alone, to wit Guillain-Barre Syndrome. 
12. At the trial of this matter Plaintiff gave testimony of 
her total gross income for 1988. It is your affiant's recollection 
that said total was $26,182.40. 
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13. The legal basis for an award of attorneyfs fees is Section 
30-3-3, Utah Code and the established law regarding awards of 
attorney's fees in actions for divorce as set forth in decisions 
such as Kerr v Kerr, 610 P2nd 1380, Beals v Beals, 682 P2nd 862, 
Cabrera v Cottrel, 694 P2nd 622, Tallev v Tallev, 739 P2nd 83, 
Newmever v Newmever, 745 P2nd 1276, Porco v Porco, 752 P2nd 365, 
Rasband v Rasband, 752 P2nd 1313, Asoar v Aspar 753 P2nd 978, 
Andersen v Andersen, 757 P2nd 476, Sorensen v Sorensen, 102 UAR 14, 
and Mauahan v Mauahan, 102 UAR 44. I believe Plaintiff justly 
deserves an award of attorney's fees and that such award to 
Plaintiff is supported by the facts and circumstances of this 
matter and the statute and decisions above cited. 
Dated this ^ ? day of ]4{A-C fr*- 1989. 
X 
Thdmas H. Means 
Affiant 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
On the (Qfi day of lAft&ClA 1989, personally appeared 
before me, Thomas H. Means, who duly acknowledged executing the 
foregoing Affidavit. 
*/ comm. \CM1 Notary Public 
Exp. 10-15-92 \tv \ (seal) 
Rickie K. Liddiard
 M Resiqang at: w My commission expires: 
t l T ? 81 E. Center St fT-fl 
c/o CJ. Jaussi / * 
Provo. UT / > 
84601 y ^ l 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the date below-noted 
he/she served a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT on the following, in the manner prescribed by Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure No, 5(b)(1), by either depositing the same in 
the U.S. Mails, addressed as below-noted, with all postage and 
other fees pre-paid, or by delivering the same to the following 
person[s] personally, or by delivering the same to a person of 
suitable age and discretion at the address[es] below-noted. 
Dated this /CJ day of 2 ^ 7 1990. 
/Y . UTAH COURT 0F APPEALS 
230 South 500 East 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102 
ROBERT L. MOODY 
Attorney for Appellant 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah, 84604 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
********************* 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER CV 87-2408 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********************* 
The Court, having reserved the issue of attorney's fees 
in this matter will rule, and will award the plaintiff $1,000.00 
based on need and the relative ability of the parties to pay. 
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare an order incorporating 
the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to filing with the Court for signature. 
Dated this 31st day of July, 1989. 
cc: Thomas H. Means, Esq. 
Robert L. Moody, Esq. 
M. HARDING, JUDGE 
FILED IN 
4TH D'.STRICI r,o:;?J 
ST.M;:. ."" "•'V'i 
OCT -3 l' : s . " i ; '89 
THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3 63 North University Avenue 
Suite 103 
P.O. BOX 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, ] 
Plaintiff, ' 
v ] 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, ] 
Defendant. 
> FINDINGS OF FACT and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) No. CV 87 2408 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 7th day of 
February, 1989. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented 
by her attorney of record, Thomas H. Means, Defendant also appeared 
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L. 
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did Plaintiff's daughter, 
Sabrina Gunderson. The parties each introduced several exhibits and 
stated their stipulations into the record. Being thereby and 
otherwise fully apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and 
filings regarding this matter, this Court, having taken the matter 
under advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, now 
hereby enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was a resident of Utah County at the time of the 
filing of her Complaint and for at least three months prior 
thereto. Defendant was a resident of Utah County at the time of the 
filing of his Counterclaim and for at least three months prior 
thereto. 
2. The parties1 marriage was solemnized on 5 October, 1984, in 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. 
3. No children have been born of this marriage and Plaintiff 
is not pregnant. Plaintiff has a minor daughter, Shirley Schantell 
Hunter (Walters) from a prior marriage, born 15 May, 1976, who 
resided with the parties during the entire period when the parties 
resided together. Plaintiff has another daughter, Sabrina 
Gunderson, now married, who resided with the parties for a short 
period when Plaintiff's mobile home was situated at 155 South 1200 
West, Orem, Utah. 
4. During the marriage, differences have developed between the 
parties, which differences the parties have unsuccessfully 
attempted to resolve. Such differences persist. 
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5. The parties have lived separate and apart from and since on 
or about 10 November, 1987. 
6. Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter 
(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at 
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, continuously since in or 
about May, 1980. Plaintiff's daughter has attended the elementary 
and secondary schools servicing that address for her entire 
education and has been and is a member of the local ward of the 
church also servicing that address. Prior to May, 1980, Plaintiff 
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was 
then located at 155 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home 
has been the minor's only home. 
7. Defendant has been employed as a civilian employee of the 
federal government from and since 1967 through the time of trial. 
8. During the parties' marriage Plaintiff has been an employee 
of United States Steel Corporation except for a period when her 
employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was the 
location where she was employed. At the time of trial, Plaintiff 
had been re-employed by Geneva Steel for a period of approximately 
one year. 
9. Neither party appears to be presently in need of or 
entitled to the continuing financial support of the other, either 
in the form alimony or child support. 
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10. The parties established a marriage-like relationship 
several years before their marriage was actually solemnized. 
While it is not possible to determine from the evidence the precise 
date when the parties began to cohabit, Plaintiff has established 
by a preponderance of the evidence, and it is reasonable from the 
evidence to find that such relationship commenced on or about 1 
January, 1980, and continued from and since that time through the 
time the marriage was solemnized and until the parties separated. 
From and since 1 January, 1980, the parties cohabited and 
commingled their efforts and their earnings in a manner such as 
would be expected of a married couple. The evidence which supports 
such finding is as follows: 
a. The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4 
December, 1978. 
b. At the time they met Plaintiff resided in her mobile 
home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 1200 West, 
Orem, Utah. Although Defendant's employment sometimes required 
temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missile 
sights, beginning shortly after'the parties first met, when not on 
TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her mobile 
home. 
c. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own name, 
a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. At that 
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same time the parties moved Plaintiff's mobile home onto that pad 
where they continued to co-habit. Defendant paid for the costs of 
moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as 
the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer connections, 
d. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the 
placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the 
realty as her residence. 
e. At various times when Defendant was on TDY 
assignments, Plaintiff helped arranged for and make physical 
improvements to the Defendant's realty on which her mobile home was 
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and 
situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. Such improvements 
included the laying of concrete pads at each location, leveling, 
laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction of out-
buildings and a metal building. 
f. While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings 
toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living 
expenses. Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the 
realty. 
g. When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant 
was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain 
Plaintiff and her daughter. 
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h. Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's 
separate debts owed to the I.R.S., the Utah State Tax Commission, 
an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase 
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile 
accident. 
i. Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintiff's minor 
daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant's knowledge and 
permission, and prior to solemnization of the marriage, attended 
school under Defendant's family name of Walters. 
j. Defendant listed his address on his federal and state 
income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah - the 
same as Plaintiff's residence - for each of the years 1979, 1980, 
1981, 1982, and 1983. 
k. Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in his 
federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent 
children who lived with you" for each of the years 1982, 1983, and 
1984. 
1. The evidence does not indicate that the parties' 
relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage. 
11. At the time of trial Defendant maintained an account at 
Deseret Bank with a balance in an amount of $800.00 and an account 
at America First Thrift with a balance in the amount of $5500.00. 
This Court is without evidence sufficient to establish whether 
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these balances were accumulated prior to or after the parties 
established their marital relationship. However, the balance of the 
America First Thrift account appears to have been accumulated after 
10 November, 1987, the date on or about which Defendant was served 
with a Temporary Restraining Order which is the same date when 
Defendant withdrew $3000.00 from the account. 
12. As of the date of trial Defendant was the record owner of 
four parcels of realty, to wit: 
a. Parcel 1-
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located Plaintiff's aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72 foot 
Concord. 
b. Parcel 2-
640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is 
located a 1975 70 foot Brighton mobile home. 
c. Parcel 3-
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
d. Parcel 4-
746 West 600 North, Orem, Utah 
13. Parcel 1 was deeded to Defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel 2 
was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to 
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract for the purchase of parcel 3 in July, 1977, 
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reciting a down-payment of $2,200.00 with annual payments toward 
the balance of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to 
commence in June, 1978. Defendant made a final payment for parcel 3 
in the amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May, 1981. The parties have 
stipulated that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem 
parcel and that he is listed as legal owner of parcel 4 only as an 
accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable 
interests in the property. Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by 
any debt. Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a 
balance as of the date of trial in the amount of approximately 
$5,000.00. 
14. Defendant testified as to the purchase prices and costs of 
improvements dedicated to parcels 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to 
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of 
trial. The parties have stipulated to this Court's acceptance into 
evidence of written appraisals of the parcels offered by Plaintiff 
and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a Certified Review Appraiser. 
This Court considers Mr. Lamoreauxfs assessment of the valuations 
of the parcels more credible than Defendant's own assessment for 
the following reasons: 
a. Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively 
on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to 
each parcel. 
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Mr. Lamoreaux's assessments are based on several 
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and 
shopping, existence or non-existence of public improvements, 
adverse easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout, 
insulation, adequacy of storage and closets, appeal and 
marketability, remaining economic life, availability for expansion, 
comparisons to recent sales of similar and proximate properties, 
income potential, highest and best use, and replacement cost. 
b. Defendant testified to having no significant training 
or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar properties. 
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his 
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate 
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he 
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to 
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general 
contractor of residential construction from 1971 to 1974, that he 
is a designated appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor, 
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review 
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association. 
Upon the foregoing, this Court accepts and adopts the 
valuations placed on the properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit: 
Parcel l, with improvements & mobile home: $20,000.00 
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Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home: $2 0,000.00 
Parcel 3, with improvements: $10,000,00 
15. The Court finds that because of the marriage-like 
relationship that began on 1 January, 1980, Plaintiff is entitled 
to a share of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the 
existence of the marriage-like relationship. The formula which is 
to be used to apportion the Plaintiff's share of the retirement 
benefit is found in Marchant v Marchant, 743 P2nd 199, (Utah App 
1987). The Plaintiff shall not receive any retirement benefits 
until the Defendant retires. If for any reason the Defendant does 
not qualify for the benefit neither will the Plaintiff. In order to 
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become 
available, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's counsel must 
prepare an order which is to be filed with the Defendant's employer 
which will give the instructions for payment of retirement benefits 
to the Plaintiff. The formula which should be used in the Order is 
"one-half of his total monthly payment times the fraction in which 
the numerator consists of the number of years or months they 
maintained the marriage-like relationship during which the 
Defendant was employed by the federal government and the 
denominator is the total number of years or months the Defendant 
was in such employment." 
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16. With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance 
affecting the property at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and 
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their 
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for 
which either party is liable either jointly or individually. 
17. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff should be 
awarded as her sole and separate property the parties1 1980 
Chrysler automobile. 
18. The parties have stipulated that Defendant should be 
awarded as his sole and separate property the parties1 1979 
Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
19. The parties have submitted their respective written lists 
of the other personalty of their marriage and have testified as to 
their respective claims to and needs for such personalty. The 
parties have each claimed entitlement to and need for many of the 
same items of personalty. From the evidence this Court is not able 
to ascertain or assign values to the various items of personalty 
listed or claimed by the parties nor does this Court have evidence 
from which it is able to determine, by a preponderance of the 
evidence which, if any, of such personalty is separate property as 
opposed to property accumulated during the parties1 marital 
relationship. 
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20. Plaintiff has incurred an obligation in excess of $4000,00 
for attorney's fees reasonable to the prosecution of her Complaint. 
The hours expended as well as the hourly rate charged were 
reasonable in light of the complexity of the matter, the results 
obtained, and the hourly rate commonly charged for similar actions 
in this area. Plaintiff is in need of an award from Defendant to 
compensate her for a portion of said attorney's fees. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving her 
marriage to Defendant. 
2. Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving his 
marriage to Plaintiff. 
3. Neither party is entitled to an award of alimony or other 
order of lump sum or periodic financial support from the other. 
4. This Court need make no orders regarding liability for 
family or marital debts except that debt affecting the realty 
situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and except 
those separate debts incurred by the parties respectively after the 
date of their separation, as are addressed hereinbelow. 
5. Each party should be held solely and individually liable 
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after 
the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. 
6. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing $4 00.00 
from Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and $2750.00 from Defendant's 
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the 
remainder of each account. 
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7. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant 
should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff. 
Defendant should retain all right, title, and interests in and to 
the parties1 realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty 
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
Such division is equitable owing to the time periods during which 
such equities were acquired in relation to the marital relationship 
that existed between the parties both prior to and after 
solemnization of their marriage, owing to the respective 
contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties 
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the 
long established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as 
well as the minor's school and religious associations, and owing to 
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of 
the monitory values of the properties. 
8. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable for 
all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty, 
improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0 South 50 West, 
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Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
9. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate 
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile. 
10. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate 
property the parties1 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
11. It is proper that the parties' personalty as noted in 
their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and 
accepted as evidence by this Court, excluding the aforementioned 
automobiles and mobile homes, be marshalled, sold, and the proceeds 
therefrom divided equally between them. 
12. Plaintiff is entitled to a proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his 
employment during the marital relationship. Such share should be 
determined according to the formula set forth in Marchant v 
Marchant, 743 P2nd 199 (Utah App. 1987). Accordingly, Plaintiff 
should not receive her share of such benefits until Defendant 
retires. If for any reason, Defendant does not qualify for such 
benefits, neither will Plaintiff. Plaintiff's proportionate share 
should be one half (50%) of the total amount of all of Defendant's 
monthly benefit payments multiplied by the fraction in which the 
numerator is the number of months comprising the period beginning 
on 1 January, 1980, and ending on the date of trial of this matter, 
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(109 months) and the denominator is the total number of months 
Defendant is employed by the federal government. The fraction 
cannot be determined until such time as Defendant shall retire. If 
Defendant separates from civil service in advance of retirement, 
and withdraws his contributions, Plaintiff should receive a portion 
of Defendants refund based upon the above-noted fraction. 
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of such portion of Defendant's 
civil service retirement benefits as well as a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order setting forth her rights in Defendant's civil 
service retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the 
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums 
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth 
hereinabove. 
13. It is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as and for her 
reasonable attorneyfs fees the sum of $1000.00. 
Dated this y day of A*gwst, 1989. 
Approved as to form: 
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^' 2' 6 1989 
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THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3 63 North University 
Suite 103 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84 603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, 
Plaintiff, j 
v
 i 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
1 DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) No. CV 87 2408 
This matter, having come on regularly for trial on the 7th day 
of February, 1989, and this Court, having taken the matter under 
advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, and having 
entered its written FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
her marriage to Defendant. 
2. Defendant is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
his marriage to Plaintiff. 
3. Each party is hereby held solely and individually liable 
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after 
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the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. Each party shall 
hold the other harmless for any and all such debts incurred in 
his/her individual name after 10 November, 1987. 
4. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties' savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing a 
$400.00 share of Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and a $2750.00 
share of Defendant's America First Thrift account. Defendant is 
hereby awarded the remainder of each account, 
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the 
parties' equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts 
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in 
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home -
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. More 
particularly described as: 
Lot 9, Plat D, Pleasant Grove Mobile Home Estates 
Defendant is hereby ordered to deed and deliver such realty to 
Plaintiff. 
6. It is hereby ordered that Defendant retain all right, 
title, and interests in and to the parties' realty and improvements 
- including the mobile home - situated at 640 South 50 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty and improvements situated at 
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. 
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7• Defendant shall be and is hereby held solely and 
individually liable for all debt encumbering, associated with, or 
owing for the realty, improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0 
South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant shall hold Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
8. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate 
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile. 
9. Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate 
property, the parties' 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
10. It is hereby ordered that the parties' personalty as noted 
in their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and 
accepted as evidence by this Court - but excepting the 
aforementioned automobiles and mobile homes - be marshalled, sold, 
and the proceeds therefrom divided equally between the parties. 
11. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his 
employment with the federal government during the marital 
relationship, which is and shall consist of one half (50%) of the 
total amount of all of Defendant's monthly benefit payments 
multiplied by the fraction in which the numerator is 109 and the 
denominator is the total number of months Defendant is employed by 
the federal government. The fraction shall be determined at such 
time as Defendant shall retire. Plaintiff shall not receive her 
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share of such benefits until Defendant retires. If Defendant 
separates from civil service in advance of retirement and withdraws 
his contributions, Plaintiff shall receive a portion of such refund 
based on the above-noted fraction. If for any reason, Defendant 
does not qualify for such benefits, neither will Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff is hereby granted and awarded such proportionate share of 
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits as well as a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order setting forth her rights in 
Defendant's retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the 
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums 
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth 
hereinabove and hereby granted and awarded to her, 
12. Plaintiff is hereby granted and Defendant is hereby 
ordered to pay as and for Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees 
the sum of $1000.00. sn , 
Dated this C/C/, day of Auguot, 1989. 
Approved as to form: 
Fourth Judicial District 
Utah County 
Robert L. Moody, #2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2525 North Canyon Road 
P.O. Box 1466 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone 801-373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS, : 
Plaintiff, : NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. : 
LEWIS MARK WALTERS, : Case No. CV 87 2408 
Judge: 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Mark Walters, by and through 
his attorney, Robert L. Moody of TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE, and 
hereby gives notice of his appeal to the Court of Appeals of the 
State of Utah from the Decree of Divorce, signed by Judge Ray M. 
Harding in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State 
of Utah, case No. CV 87 2408. Said Decree was signed and entered 
on the 13th day of October, 1989, by Judge Ray M. Harding and was 
filed in the Office of the Clerk thereof the same day. An 
Amended Decree was signed by Judge Ray M. Harding on the 30th day 
of October, 1989, and filed in the Office of the Clerk thereof 
- 1 -
the same day. Defendant does hereby appeal from the whole of 
said decision. 
DATED this § day of November, 1989. 
hu^f^ 
ROBERT L. MOODY ^  
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
8b-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 d a v o f November, 
1989, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Thomas 
Means, Attorney for Plaintiff, 363 North University Ave., Suite 
103, Provo, Utah 84601; postage prepaid. 
- 2 -
POINT III 
RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD TO HER OF 
$1000.00 AS AND FOR HER REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES 
Appellant contests the trial court's award of $1,000.00 to 
Helen for attorney fees claiming she did not establish her need for 
the award. However, Appellant's challenge to the trial court's 
award of attorney fees to Respondent fails for two reasons. 
First, Appellant has waived his right to challenge the award 
by his failure to lodge his objection below. He cannot raise the 
issue anew in this appeal. This court has recently cited with 
authority the general rule that "'[i]t would be manifestly unjust 
to permit a party to sit silently by, believing that prejudicial 
error has been committed' and then 'if he loses, come forward' 
claiming error." Onveabor v Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P2nd 525 (Utah 
App. 1990), citing Hill v Cloward. 377 P2nd 186 (Utah 1962). See 
also, Cunningham v Cunningham. 690 P2nd 549 (Utah 1984); Edgar v 
Wagner. 572 P2nd 405 (Utah 1977); In Re Ekker. 432 P2nd 45 (Utah 
1967) .5 
5
 Several recent cases involving appeals from criminal 
convictions have also applied this rule requiring preservation of 
issues for appeal. See, State v Carter. 707 P2nd 656 (Utah 1985); 
State v Arrovo. 770 P2nd 153 (Utah App. 1989); State v Johnson. 
774 P2nd 1141 (Utah 1989); State v Schlosser. 774 P2nd 1132 (Utah 
1989); State v Pacheco. 778 P2nd 26 (Utah App. 1989); State v Webb. 
790 P2nd 65 (Utah App. 1990); State v Marshall. 132 Utah Ad. Rep. 
45 (Utah App. 1990). 
17 
In this matter, at the direction of the trial court as 
indicated in its first MEMORANDUM DECISION, Respondent's counsel 
submitted an affidavit setting forth the basis, amount, and 
justification for attorney's fees. Appellant made no objection to 
the affidavit and claimed no error at the trial level as regards 
the claim or the award of attorney's fees. As Appellant has failed 
to preserve this claim of error now raised for the first time in 
this appeal, this court should refuse to address the claim. 
Second, should this court decide Appellant has properly 
preserved this claim, it must determine if Respondent established a 
need for the award. Appellant has argued that because Respondent 
admitted in the affidavit that she was totally self supportive from 
her earnings at Geneva Steel and because the trial court found that 
neither party was in need of the continuing financial support of 
the other "either in the form of alimony or child support," she was 
not in need of the award. In so arguing, Appellant is equating the 
need required for an award of alimony with need required for the 
award of attorney's fees. Appellant cites no cases in support of 
that proposition. And, while this court has issued many cases 
addressing attorney's fees in domestic cases, none seems to have 
specifically stated what quantum of need is necessary to support 
such an award. It therefore appears that Appellant's burden in this 
regard is to establish that the trial court's finding that 
18 
Respondent needed the award was "clearly erroneous" in the manner 
set forth in Point I hereinabove. Appellant has failed to do so and 
the trial court's finding should be sustained. 
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QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
I ! 
Lewis M. Walters
 t 
Vera L. Walters 
oi
 117 West Pacific Drive American Fork Utah 
— T e n Dollars and other valuable consideration-
the following described tract of land in Utah 
State of Utah: 
grantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
grantee 
for the sum of 
. .DOLLARS, 
County, 
All of Lot 9. Plat "DH Pleasant grove mobile home estates, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, • according to the official plat thereof 
on file in the office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah. 
Subject to Restrict!*** Covenants recorded December 9, 1971, 
as Entry No. 16651, in Book 1251, at Page 395 of the 
Offical Records ~t Utah County, Utah. 
1 
I i V J T N W S the hand oi said grantor , this ^ ^ \ 
^ KVU.Q.V>V • A. D. one thousand nine hundred and <%cf 
Signed in the presence of 
^m-
&eji 
Mu. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Conner o£ U i M \ 
On tht 
thoumkj nine 1 
} - : , : * 
day-of V \ * *.<?t\ 
personally appeared before me 
day of 
A.D.< 
ILAMK W. \6¥- 19 «c« #T«. CO. - M I »o x*ol Ixif - ULf Unl 4ift 
t, who duly acknowledge to me that h« executed the 
Notary Public. 
fn- ****** uX^CLc^A-
^ ^ ^ ' ^ - j w a w " , ii ' ' i'l'-'V-.ywgwwi»spiMii^iim%Mwiiii!iiJ'^j}'.'^'U'M.N'.«r»~ 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
I, THC UNDfRSIGNED RECORDER OF UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
DO HCRCBY CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREOOMQ « A 
TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL RECORDED DOCUMENT W TWi 
OFFICIAL RECOROjH MY OF«CE A3 THE SAME APPEARS IN 
BOOK zL'-LSJe. AT^ ASE 7 / ) 
WITNESS MY HAHD A\Z> 'Vt-«. OF SAIC Crf IZZ TK'.S ^> 
DAY OF 7 T ^ / r 19 7<* 
N!NA B. ftEJO, RECOnOER T 
- .,..»,, J. RE!0, RE£OnOC. 
^sxmvv^^ 
8160 Krctow4in*TO*nifc 
: :
 — B85WK3I WB37 
UTAH COUNTY, " 
Spec* Abort for RacttaWa Pes U / - ' t t 
** ..._*** v.. 
WARRANTY DEED 
Levi* M. Matters 
of Pleasant Grove, Utah . Cossty of 
hereby CONVEY tad WARRANT to 
Vera L. Walters 
Utah 
, grantor 
, State of Utah, 
K7 (A/. Roc/fa DK. 
of fcnerican Pork* Utah , County of 
, grantee 
Utah , State of Utah 
for the nan of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable considerations----DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Utah County, State of Utah, to-wtt: 
Lot 11, Plat "D", Pleasant Grove Mobile Home Estates 
WITNESS tha hand of said grantor , thia 31 . day of March 
Signed in tha presence of 
, 19 69 
Lewis M. Walters 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of ^ 1-
On tha 31 day of 
personally appeared before ma 
March 
Lewis M. Walters 
the signer of tha above instrument, who duly acknowl 
, ! • 89 
operated tha 
V.Vrj, -s , c y •:-. 
i:f A ^ P t f t ^ ^ «xp*r,» 
cno jedged to ma that ha exi 
ng in Pleasant Grove, Utah 
1:1-. '*+"- ;'•••• 
! C •' APPROVED FORM — UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION 
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tfktoaMei.;.;}-
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
I, THE UNOER$IG«tn RECORDER OF UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
DO HEREBY CERTIFY u«AT ^UE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING 18 A 
TRUE COPY C? TV£ OfciGlNAI. RECCRwCQ DOCUMENT IN THE 
OFFICIAL F.SCr HO^I MY OFFICE AS THE SAtf? APPEARS IN 
BOOK i 22 j32 f AT PACE ^Y2~ ^ 
WITNESS MY KA.^ / f-.k ^EAl Or bA4C GrF.CS THIS 
DAY OF »x^*rzr~ i« £k2 
ORM 
.DEPUTY 
FW «sooa u a?7? re sa; 
HIHA ft R£10 UTAH CO RECOftKR BY flft 
1939 FO 21 12128 Ptl FEE 7.00 7 
Recofded at Request of lIT / M p g . j * J * g ? g J * , S 3 g 
at 11 Fes Paid* 
. Dtp. Book Pag* Raf.: 
Kail *»»™*fc—«* AAilrni 
WARRANTY DEED 
LEVIS NARK WALTERS grantor 
of American Fork .County of Utah , State of Utah, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
STAN SAPP 
frantcc 
of 775 North 300 East , Pleasant Grove, Utah for tht turn of 
-Ten Dol lars and other valuable cons iderat ion - - - - - DOLLARS. 
the following described tract of land Jnv Utah County. 
State of Utah: 
Conmencing 10 Chains west and 583 fee t north fron the southeast 
corner of the southwest quarter of Sect ion 2 , Township 5 South, 
Range 1 East , Sal t Lake Rase and Meridian; thence west 132 f e e t ; 
thence north 110 fee t ; thence east 132 f e e t ; thence south 
110 fee t to point of beginning. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor .this 28 th day of 
February , A. D. 19 89 
Siffaed in thtJPrtsenca of \^L**^~~* *~^^"-t^y^/^^^J 
Y Lewis Mark Walters 
I-STATE 01 UTAH, County of UTAfe 
On the 28th day of February , A. D. 1989 
parsonany appeared befor* ma
 L e w i 9 M a r k V a l t e r s 
the* *lgi«ir.,>of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to DM that ha executed tht 
ham*— Pi V 
NoUry Public. 
^ My ^mmisaioo expir-a. 1 ( M J " 9 ° Residingjn
 m ^ ^^ 
• U A N K « iO«- « 4 M u m 0 « « » ~ 0 GEM PRINTING CO — **w» «.*«corv ~~ 
~ ' '
W
' W T ^ ^ 
STATE OP OTAM 
COUNTY OP UTAH 
I, THE UNOERSIONED RECORDER OF UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED ANO FONSQMKl IB A 
TRME COPY OF THE ORIGINAL RECORDED DOCUMENT « THE 
OFFICIAL RECORD IN MY OFFICE AS THE SAME APPEARS IN 
BOON Z£~7 J
 AT PAGe _£^£f7_ 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SfiAl OF SAID OFFICE THIS ^ ' 
DAY OF ^ f P »Z2 
v NINAS. RtW, RECORDER— 
